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1 Introduction 
The boom in commodity prices more generally, and crude oil prices in particular, since 
the early 2000s and their remarkable collapse in late 2008, has sparked interest in both 
academic and policy circles.1 In an influential paper, Tang and Xiong (2012) argue that 
increasing index investment in commodities markets since early 2000s has caused the 
futures prices of different commodities in the US to comove together. This was 
especially the case for the commodities in the two popular Goldman Sachs (GSCI) and 
Dow Jones (DJ-UBS) commodity indices, in both of which crude oil is a prominent 
component. Commodities were identified as a distinct investment category by fund 
managers and also began to comove positively with equity markets. Tang and Xiong 
argue that this reflects the financialisation of commodities markets and can explain 
many aspects of the recent synchronized price boom and bust of seemingly unrelated 
commodities. 
 Despite widespread agreement that institutional investor interest in commodities 
increased sharply in the early 2000s, there is no consensus on whether this altered the 
functioning of markets or contributed significantly to price behaviour in the 2004-2008 
price run-up and subsequent collapse. Many attribute the boom-bust price changes to 
fundamental supply factors such as disruptions to production and/or to demand 
factors. In particular, proponents of the fundamental view have focused on the rapid 
growth of large emerging markets like China and India, fuelling a boom in demand for 
commodities and leading to the spike in commodity prices before the summer of 2008 
                                                        
1 This boom and bust cycle in commodity markets also caused serious concerns among practitioners and 
policy makers that excessive speculation might have been the main driver of rising energy and food prices 
(see, for example, Masters, 2008; Soros, 2008; US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
2006). In response, the US Congress passed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act that aimed, inter alia, at preventing excessive speculative influences on prices. 
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(see for example, Krugman, 2008; Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2009; and Irwin and Sanders, 
2011). Prices subsequently fell sharply with the onset of the world recession. Others 
such as Masters (2008) argue that institutional investors2 have contributed towards the 
deviation of commodity prices from their fundamental values leading to a speculative 
bubble that popped in late 2008.  
The recent literature is more nuanced and addresses the question of whether the 
huge financial inflows caused by financialisation may have induced some commodity 
price changes. Singleton (2014) posits that informational frictions and associated 
speculative activity may induce prices to drift away from their fundamental values and 
may result in commodity price booms and busts within a rational differences of opinion 
framework.3 He presents new evidence that there were economically and statistically 
significant effects of investor flows on futures prices after controlling for a number of 
standard factors. The largest impacts on futures prices were from the growth in 
commodity fund index positions and institutional spread positions and these operated 
through risk or informational channels. He also established that hedge fund trading in 
futures spread positions impacted the shape of the term structure of oil futures prices. 
This paper presents new evidence that directly relates to Singleton’s findings. Its 
first contribution is that it formally tests the Singleton hypothesis that prices tend to 
drift away from their fundamental values employing recently developed bubble tests. A 
series of such tests is applied to examine the null hypothesis that there is no bubble in 
spot and futures oil prices using contracts along the yield curve with maturities of up to 
twenty four months. It is this novel examination of whether bubbles emerge in different 
                                                        
2 One of the challenges of evaluating the effect of speculative behavior is the lack of precise relevant data 
on institutional commodity contract positions over a sufficiently long period of time. 
3 Cheng and Xiong (2013) and Sockin and Xiong (2015) also stress the role of informational frictions and 
limits to arbitrage. 
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segments of the futures yield curve which is at the core of the paper. Subsequently, it 
applies the recent bubble dating strategy of Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013) to take into 
account the possibility of multiple bubbles. This strategy consistently estimates the 
origination and collapse dates of each bubble even when they are of different 
magnitudes. Our empirical analysis produces some striking results. Firstly, using 
monthly data for the sample period September 1995 to December 2013, the results 
indicate that all series exhibited extended periods of bubble behaviour that ended in 
late 2008. Secondly, the dating algorithm shows that the bubbles in longer-dated 
contracts started much earlier, in some cases as early as 2004, and thus were longer 
lasting than the bubble in the spot contract. The findings are qualitatively similar at the 
weekly data frequency. The earlier development of bubbles in distant contracts can be 
considered as a price-disconnect between spot and futures markets. Although our 
theory points to rational bubbles as a possible explanation, we remain agnostic as to the 
cause and note that such bubbles could be underpinned by information frictions, 
differences of opinion, limits to arbitrage, excess speculation, or time-varying discount 
factors (see Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2012; Singleton, 2014; Phillips and Yu, 2011). 
In a recent study of single bubble testing procedures, Harvey, Leybourne, Sollis, 
and Taylor (2015) show that changes in the unconditional variance might cause the 
spurious finding of a bubble in the corresponding price series. Since the volatility of 
crude oil futures contracts may have increased around 2004, we test for structural 
breaks in the unconditional variance.4 Evidence of breaks is found and therefore the 
                                                        
4 We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. 
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Harvey et al. (2015) bootstrap procedure is subsequently applied.5 The results suggest 
that our original bubble findings are robust. 
The second contribution is that our analysis of the crude oil futures yield curve 
over the 2004-2008 bubble period sheds new light on financialisation. The sharp 
downward slope of the yield curve in 2004 provides a clear rationale for the large 
investment flows into long positions. The subsequent dramatic shifts in the yield curve 
at longer maturities, associated with increased institutional spread positions, are 
consistent with sharp price increases in long-dated contracts that may have precipitated 
the bubble. Our Phillips, Shi and Yu (2013) test results provide more clearcut and 
extensive evidence of bubbles than the extant literature. Gilbert (2010) tests whether 
nearby futures prices exhibited bubble behaviour over the 2006 to 2008 period and 
strikingly reports a very short bubble in the crude oil market. Phillips and Yu (2011) 
and Shi and Arora (2012) find a short-lived bubble in spot oil prices over the period 
March to July 2008. Moreover, Phillips and Yu (2011) show a potential transmission 
mechanism: the bubble behaviour in commodity markets appears to have migrated 
from the housing market.6  
 The final contribution is that the findings may have practical policy implications. 
Our results raise the possibility that relevant information about potential future spot 
price bubbles may be gleaned from longer-dated futures prices. Bubble tests on long 
maturity oil futures contracts may prove useful for real-time monitoring and early 
warning signals for bubble formation. To provide a theoretical basis for such an 
investigation, this paper first outlines a rational bubble approach where it shows that, 
                                                        
5 The extant literature does not yet provide a non-stationary variance correction for the multiple bubble 
tests used in this paper. We therefore apply the Harvey et al. (2015) bootstrap procedure for the single 
bubble test as an approximation. 
6 Lammerding et al. (2013) also present evidence of a speculative bubble in recent nearby crude oil 
futures prices.  
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under particular conditions, an expectation of a spot price bubble in the future will 
generate explosive behaviour in the relevant futures prices prior to the appearance of 
the spot price bubble.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background on the price-bubble relationship for storable commodities. Section 3 
describes the econometric approach for testing for rational bubbles and date stamping. 
Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5 whilst a final section concludes. 
 
2 The theory of rational bubbles in commodity markets  
We follow Diba and Grossman (1988b) and explain the price change of storable 
commodities by changes in expected future net payoffs defined as ‘fundamentals’. The 
current spot price of a commodity, 𝑆𝑡, is determined by the present value of next 
period's expected spot price, 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑡+1], and the marginal convenience yield, 𝐶𝑡: 
𝑆𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑡+1 + 𝐶𝑡]
(1 + 𝑅)
 (1) 
where 𝐸𝑡[. ] denotes the expectation conditional on the information at time 𝑡 and 𝑅 is a 
time invariant interest rate. The net of storage cost marginal convenience yield 
measures the benefit from holding inventories per unit of commodity over the period 𝑡 
to 𝑡 + 1 and is analogous to the dividend on a stock. Under the theory of storage it 
should satisfy the standard no arbitrage condition: 
𝐶𝑡 = (1 + 𝑅)𝑆𝑡 − 𝐹1,𝑡 (2) 
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where 𝐹1,𝑡 denotes the futures price at time 𝑡 for delivery of a commodity at 𝑡 + 1. If 𝑆𝑡 
and 𝐶𝑡 are both integrated processes, the series are cointegrated with specific 
cointegrating vector [1, −1/𝑅] (see Campbell and Shiller, 1987). Solving (2) for 𝐹1,𝑡 and 
re-arranging, it follows that the difference between contemporaneous futures and spot 
prices is the interest forgone in storing the commodity over the period 𝑡 to 𝑡 +  1, less 
the marginal convenience yield.  
Solving the difference Equation (1) forward and applying the law of iterated 
expectations, yields: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 [∑
1
(1 + 𝑅)𝜏+1
∞
𝜏=0
𝐶𝑡+𝜏] + lim
𝜏→∞
𝐸𝑡 [
1
(1 + 𝑅)𝜏
𝑆𝑡+𝜏] . (3) 
Imposing the transversality condition, lim
𝜏→∞
𝐸𝑡[(1 + 𝑅)
−𝜏𝑆𝑡+𝜏] = 0, eliminates the last 
term in (3). It follows that the price 𝑆𝑡 collapses to the discounted sum of expected 
future payoffs, i.e. the fundamental value which will be denoted by 𝑆𝑡
𝑓
. However, if the 
transversality condition does not hold, there are infinitely many solutions to (3) that 
take the form: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡
𝑓 + 𝐵𝑡 (4) 
where 𝐵𝑡 is a bubble component that has to satisfy: 
𝐵𝑡 = (1 + 𝑅)
−1𝐸𝑡 [𝐵𝑡+1]. (5) 
In other words, the bubble has to grow over time at a rate 𝑅 in order for investors agree 
to hold the asset (see Blanchard and Watson, 1982). Diba and Grossman (1988a) argue 
that rational bubbles cannot be negative. If a bubble is negative, then when it erupts, it 
could make the price of the security negative also. In addition, if 𝐵𝑡 = 0 (5) implies that 
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𝐵𝑡+1 = 0 with probability 1. It follows that the existence of bubbles would be consistent 
with rationality only when 𝐵𝑡 > 0. 
Taken together, Equations (1) and (2) imply that the futures price is an unbiased 
predictor of the future spot price 
𝐹1,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑡+1] (6) 
Given the decomposition of the spot price in (4), it follows that the contemporaneous 
futures price with maturity 𝑡 + 𝑇 embodies information about the expected value of the 
bubble component over the period 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 𝑇: 
𝐹𝑇,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑡+𝑇
𝑓 ] + 𝐸𝑡[𝐵𝑡+𝑇] (7) 
In line with (5), the bubble is expected to grow exponentially at rate 𝑅, i.e. 𝐸𝑡[𝐵𝑡+𝑇] 
contains the root (1 + 𝑅)𝑇 that is greater than unity. If the bubble erupts at some future 
time 𝑡 + 𝑗, for 1 < 𝑗 < 𝑇, it will induce explosive behaviour in the price series of futures 
contracts with maturity greater than 𝑡 + 𝑗. 
To test for rational bubbles in the stock market, Diba and Grossman (1988b) 
motivate the use of stationarity tests. However, Evans (1991) suggests that this 
approach would not efficiently detect periods of explosive behaviour if bubbles collapse 
periodically. Consistent with the process in (5), he considers bubbles described by: 
𝐵𝑡+1 = [(1 + 𝑅)𝐵𝑡𝐼{𝐵𝑡 ≤ 𝛼}
+ [𝜑 + 𝜋−1(1 + 𝑅)𝜃𝑡+1(𝐵𝑡+1 − (1 + 𝑅)
−1𝜑]𝐼{𝐵𝑡 > 𝛼}]𝑢𝑡+1 
(8) 
where 0 < 𝜑 < (1 + 𝑅)𝛼, 𝑢𝑡+1 is a positive iid variable with 𝐸𝑡[𝑢𝑡+1] = 1, and 𝐼{∙} is an 
indicator function that assumes a value of 1 when the condition in the braces is true and 
0 otherwise. 𝜃𝑡+1 is an iid Bernoulli process and the probability of 𝜃𝑡+1 = 0 is (1 − 𝜋) 
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and 𝜃𝑡+1 = 1 is 𝜋, where 0 < 𝜋 < 1. Such a bubble would start to grow at a rate (1 +
𝑅)𝜋−1 once it exceeds some threshold level 𝛼, but with a probability (1 − 𝜋) the bubble 
will collapse to an expected mean level 𝜑. Since a bubble never collapses to zero, it will 
start growing again without violating the non-negativity constraint given in Diba and 
Grossman (1988a). 
The non-linear bubble process in (8) causes the data series to exhibit global 
characteristics similar to a stationary process. As a result, conventional unit root tests 
applied to the full sample would lack power, failing to adequately to test the null 
hypothesis of no bubbles. Phillips at al. (2011) suggest the application of a unit root test 
in a recursive window framework to overcome this drawback. Their approach allows 
the test statistics to be time dependent and therefore is able to detect explosive 
behaviour in time series even when bubbles are periodically collapsing. 
 
3 Testing for mildly explosive behaviour 
3.1 Bubble tests 
Suppose we observe the sequence {𝑌𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇  and estimate the following autoregression: 
Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇𝑌 + 𝛿𝑟𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝑢𝑡      for     𝑡 = 1,2, … , ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋     and     𝑟 ∈ [𝑟0, 1] (9) 
where 𝑢𝜏 is white noise, 𝑟 is a fraction of the total sample and ⌊𝑥⌋ denotes the integer 
part of 𝑥. The recursive window of the regression expands forward by one observation 
at a time from some initial sample ⌊𝑟0𝑇⌋. Consistent with Phillips et al. (2011), tests 
adopted in our empirical analysis are performed under the null that the time series 
contains a unit root at every 𝑡: 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡          for        𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇. (10) 
Under the alternative hypothesis, Phillips at al. (2011) specify a data generating process 
where the series starts as a unit root but switches to a regime of mildly explosive 
behaviour (𝛿 is greater than unity but still in its vicinity) at date ⌊𝑟𝑒𝑇⌋ until ⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋. At date 
⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋ the series returns to a unit root regime. The model is defined as: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1𝐼{𝑡 < ⌊𝑟𝑒𝑇⌋} + 𝛿𝑛𝑌𝑡−1𝐼{⌊𝑟𝑒𝑇⌋ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ ⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋}
+ ( ∑ 𝑢𝑗
𝑡
𝑗=⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋+1
+ 𝑌⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋
∗ ) 𝐼{𝑡 > ⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋} + 𝑢𝑡𝐼{𝑡 ≤ ⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋} 
(11) 
where 𝛿𝑛 = 1 + 𝑐𝑛
−𝜂 with 𝑐 > 0 and 𝜂 ∈ (0,1), and 𝑌⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋
∗ = 𝑌⌊𝑟𝑒𝑇⌋ + 𝑂𝑝(1). 
The restrictions on the parameter 𝑐 and values of 𝜂 over the specified open 
interval yield the mildly explosive process discussed in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, 
2007b). The boundary as 𝜂 → 1 includes the local to unity case where defining a bubble 
period is not possible (see Phillips and Yu, 2011). 
Phillips at al. (2011) suggest the application of the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-
statistics to the recursive autoregression in (9) to test the null hypothesis of a unit root 
or no bubbles. The test statistic is given as: 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟∈[𝑟0,1]
{𝐴𝐷𝐹0
𝑟}           (12) 
where 𝐴𝐷𝐹0
𝑟 is the ADF statistic from (9) evaluated between 𝑡 = 1 and 𝑡 = ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋. 
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Homm and Breitung (2012) propose a similar procedure, but under the 
assumption that a break in the autoregressive coefficient occurs at observation ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋. 
The model is written as: 
Δ𝑌𝑡 = {
                 𝜇𝑌 + 𝑢𝜏         if   𝑡 ≤ ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋
 𝜇𝑌 + 𝛿𝑟𝑌𝜏−1 + 𝑢𝜏        if   𝑡 > ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋
 (13) 
The null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛿𝑟 = 0 is then tested against the alternative 𝐻1: 𝛿 > 0 by using 
the supremum of a sequence of backward recursive Chow tests. Specifically, the test 
statistic is the following: 
𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟∈[0,1−𝑟0]
{𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑟
1}   and      𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑟
1 =
∑ Δ𝑌𝑡
∗𝑌𝑡−1
∗𝑇
𝑡=⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1
?̂?𝑟√∑ (𝑌𝑡−1
∗ )2𝑇𝜏=⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1
 
(14) 
where  
?̂?𝑟
2 = (𝑇 − 2)−1 ∑ (∆𝑌𝑡 − 𝜇𝑌 − 𝛿𝜏𝑌𝑡−1𝐼{𝑡 > ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋})
2𝑇
𝑡=2 , 
Δ𝑌𝑡
∗ = Δ𝑌𝑡 −
1
𝑇
∑ Δ𝑌𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1     and     𝑌𝑡−1
∗ = 𝑌𝑡−1 −
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑌𝑗−1
𝑇
𝑗=⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1  
 
and δ̂τ is the least squares estimator of 𝛿 from Equation (13).  
Homm and Breitung (2012) also motivate the use of Busetti-Taylor statistics on 
the assumption that the series has a unit root up to observation ⌊𝑟𝑇⌋ after which it 
switches to a regime of explosive behaviour. Using a random walk model to forecast the 
final value 𝑌𝑇 from the periods 𝑌⌊𝑟𝑇⌋, 𝑌⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1, … , 𝑌𝑇−1 should result in a large sum of 
squared forecast errors. The modified version of the statistic is given by: 
𝑆𝐵𝑇(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟∈[0,1−𝑟0]
{𝐵𝑇𝑟
1} (15) 
where 
𝐵𝑇𝑟
1 =
𝑇−1
(𝑇−⌊𝑟𝑇⌋)2 ∑ ?̂?0,𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ 𝜖1̂,𝑡1,𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=⌊𝑟𝑇⌋+1 , 
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and 𝜖0̂,𝑡 are the OLS residuals from the regression of Δ𝑌𝑡 on an intercept, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 
whilst 𝜖1̂,𝑡 are the OLS residuals from the regression of (𝑌𝑇 − 𝑌𝑡−1) on an intercept, 𝑡 =
⌊𝑟𝑇⌋ + 1, … , 𝑇. Evidence against the null hypothesis of no bubble in all of the above tests 
is obtained by comparing the sup statistics with the corresponding right-sided critical 
values from the limit distribution. However, the above procedures do not facilitate the 
identification of the explosive period. In doing so, it is desirable to set some minimum 
duration for this bubble period to successfully to discriminate between bubbles and 
short-lived blips. 
 
3.2  The bubble dating algorithm 
Techniques that can help identify bubble periods are useful as a real-time monitoring 
procedures and early warning signals for bubble formation. They also overcome some 
weaknesses of the suggested tests above. For example, the 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶(𝑟0) and 𝑆𝐵𝑇(𝑟0) 
procedures assume that the time series switches to mildly explosive behaviour at some 
date over the interval [0,1 − 𝑟0]. Homm and Breitung (2012) using extensive Monte 
Carlo simulations find that, when there is a one-time change in the time series 
behaviour, even if this change is random, both tests have an advantage over the 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test in terms of power. But, if there is an additional break signalling a return 
to a unit root process, this advantage disappears.    
The technique described next is robust to multiple breaks in the series. Under the 
data generating process in (11), the series switches from unit root to mildly explosive 
behaviour for a period of time and then returns to a unit root. The break dates are 
defined as ⌊𝑟𝑒𝑇⌋ and ⌊𝑟𝑓𝑇⌋, respectively. Phillips et al. (2011) provide consistent 
estimators of the break points as the first and last observation at which the 𝐴𝐷𝐹0
𝑟 
statistic is significant at some level 𝛽𝑇 . However, Phillips et al. (2013) consider a more 
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general case where the 𝐴𝐷𝐹 statistics are still computed for the interval 𝑟2 ∈ [𝑟0, 1] but 
now for each recursion the starting point varies over the feasible range 𝑟1 ∈ [0, 𝑟 − 𝑟0]. 
They show that this procedure is more efficient when multiple bubbles are present in 
the data. The generalized test statistic is: 
𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟2∈[𝑟0,1]
𝑟1∈[0,𝑟2−𝑟0]
{𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2} 
(16) 
To estimate the fraction points for the origination and collapse points of the bubble, 
Phillips et al. (2013) recommend using a backward sup ADF test to improve dating 
accuracy. In essence, this is an 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test on a backward increasing sample in which 
the endpoint ⌊𝑟2𝑇⌋ is fixed and the initial observation changes over the region 𝑡 = 1 and 
𝑡 = 𝑇⌊𝑟2 − 𝑟0⌋. The backward 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test can therefore be written:  
 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟1∈[0,𝑟2−𝑟0]
{𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟1
𝑟2} (17) 
and the origination and collapse points: 
 ?̂?𝑒  = inf
𝑟2≥𝑟0
 {𝑟2: 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2(𝑟0) > 𝑐𝑣𝛽𝑇(𝑟2)}  and  (18) 
 ?̂?𝑓 = inf
𝑟2≥?̂?𝑒+𝛾
ln(𝑇)
𝑇
 {𝑟2: 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2(𝑟0) < 𝑐𝑣𝛽𝑇(𝑟2)} 
where 𝑐𝑣𝛽𝑇  are the right-side 100𝛽𝑇% critical values of the 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) statistics for ⌊𝑇𝑟2⌋ 
observations. It should be noted that 𝛾
ln (𝑇)
𝑇
 is the minimum duration necessary for a 
part of the series to qualify as a bubble period. The parameter is chosen based on the 
sampling frequency so that periods shorter than ⌊𝛾
ln (𝑇)
𝑇
⌋ observations are considered 
insignificant (see Phillips and Yu, 2011). Finally, it can be seen that the date stamping 
methodology above, based on the backward sup ADF test, corresponds to the 
𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) as:  
 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) = sup
𝑟2∈[𝑟0,1]
{𝐵𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹𝑟2(𝑟0)} (19) 
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4 Data and sample characteristics 
Daily WTI crude oil prices for the spot and futures contracts on NYMEX were 
downloaded from DataStream for the period September 1995 to December 2013. The 
starting date of the sample was dictated by the availability of data for longer-dated 
contracts from 15 to 24 months. In fact, data were collected for futures contracts with a 
range of maturities along the yield curve including 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 and 24 
months. It should be noted that NYMEX crude oil futures usually expire on the third 
business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month preceding the delivery month.  
For the empirical analysis, a monthly series of 220 observations for each spot and 
associated nine futures contracts was constructed using closing daily prices on the last 
business day of each month. As an aid to explanation, Table 1 summarises the 
relationship between the selected price of contract j (i.e., 𝐹𝑗,𝑡) and its expiration and 
delivery month, for the first observation of the sample at  𝑡 = 1. 
[Table 1 around here] 
Remembering that our sample begins in September 1995, Table 1 shows that on the last 
business day of that month, the contract that expires the following month provides the 
price for observation (𝐹1,1 ). Likewise, on that same day, the contract that expires in three 
months provides the price for observation (𝐹3,1 ). The first observation for contract 
maturities 6 to 24 months is analogously collected. The data are sampled monthly, and 
therefore as we move forward to the last business day of October, we collect the prices 
(𝐹1,2 ), (𝐹3,2 ) and so on. In this manner, our constant maturity series are constructed.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of log returns for both spot and futures 
contracts over the full 1995-2013 sample in Panel A and three non-overlapping 
subsamples.  
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[Table 2 around here] 
The first subsample extends from 1995 up to the end of 2003 and the results are 
displayed in Panel B. The second subsample results cover the January 2004 to June 
2008 price run-up period and are in Panel C. The start point was chosen to highlight the 
effect of increased investment flows and, in particular, institutional investor flows into 
commodities since 2004 as highlighted, inter alios, by Tang and Xiong (2012). The final 
subsample commences in July 2008 and extends up to the end of 2013 and so covers the 
financial crisis and economic downturn period. 
 Table 2 reveals some interesting patterns. First, the full sample period and the pre-
2004 period are strikingly similar, especially in terms of their mean log return and  
standard deviation. Log returns exhibit positive skewness that increases along the yield 
curve for both periods although it is more pronounced at longer maturities for the full 
sample period.  Both periods exhibit mild excess kurtosis that is always negative for the 
full sample but mainly negative for the pre-2004 subsample. 
 Second, the 2004-2008 subsample results in Panel C exhibit sharp changes as 
compared with those for the earlier subsample in Panel B. The mean monthly log return 
is now in the 2.7% to 3% range which is some 4.5 to 6 times that in the earlier period. 
Given the search for yield prior to the sub-prime crisis, the increased post-2004 
investment in passive CIFs (Commodity Index Funds) is thus no surprise. More 
strikingly, the mean standard deviation is actually lower at the short end (up to 3 
months) of the yield curve post-2004 as compared with the pre-2004 period despite the 
post-2004 mean return being 4.5 times higher. The log return standard deviation 
decreases monotonically along the yield curve from 0.078 for the nearby 1-month 
contract to just 0.059 for the 24-month contract which made trading in distant contracts 
even more attractive since returns increased modestly along the yield curve. This was 
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an important factor in the increased popularity of managed money spreads  highlighted, 
by Singleton (2014), where investors go long a distant contract and short a nearby one. 
The final difference between the pre-and post-2004 subsamples is that all contracts in 
Panel C are negatively skewed but those in Panel B are correspondingly positively 
skewed whilst excess kurtosis is similarly mild in both periods.  
Overall, spot and futures oil price dynamics changed significantly after 2004. 
Prices changes remained in a very narrow range during 1995-2003 in comparison to 
the 2004-2013 period when the maximum price for all contracts was close to $140 per 
barrel. Prices reached an all-time high in 2008 followed by a sharp collapse. The above 
factors point to distinct investor behaviour in the post-2004 period. For example, 
Büyükşahin et al. (2009) show that the growth of large net positions in long-dated 
contracts by hedge funds and other investors dates from 2004 and 2005. 
To further investigate the relationship between spot and futures prices, Figure 1 
plots the sample average of the futures-spot differential (i.e. the basis) over three 
periods: the pre-2004 period in panel A, the January 2004 - June 2008 price run-up 
period in Panel B, and the post-bubble period July 2008 – December 2013.   
[Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 can be viewed as depicting the average term structure or yield curve for 
futures prices. In line with the literature, the basis is measured as: 
𝐹𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡
 (20) 
The sharply downward sloping futures yield curve in Panel A implies that the crude oil 
futures market was backwardated prior to 2004 and the average basis at all maturities 
is always negative.  A trader with a long futures position on average would realize a 
positive return from rolling her position forward into the cheaper (next) nearby 
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contract. Panel B shows that the futures market was still mainly backwardated in the 
price run-up period from 2004 to August 2008 but the slope is now much flatter (see 
below for more details). 
 Panel C shows that the futures yield curve switched to contango with a positive 
slope in the period commencing late 2008. By contrast with the earlier periods, the 
average basis at all maturities is always positive. Contracts further out along the curve 
now cost more and so rolling a nearby long position to the next contract would on 
average be loss making. This is consistent with recent studies such as Acharya, 
Lochstoer, and Ramadorai (2012) and Cheng and Xiong (2014) that stress that 
investors’ risk-bearing capacity and thus their appetite for risk sharing vary over time. 
In particular, their reduced risk appetite during crises may lead them to unwind their 
positions rather than take on extra risk. 
 
5  Empirical results 
5.1 Bubble test results 
As noted earlier, the power of the 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶(𝑟0) and 𝑆𝐵𝑇(𝑟0) tests deteriorate if the bubble 
bursts within the sample period. Homm and Breitung (2012) suggest that successive 
observations following the explosive period are excluded from the sample to overcome 
this problem. The spectacular downturn in the price of oil since June 2008 bears a close 
resemblance to a collapsing bubble. Therefore, the 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶(𝑟0) and 𝑆𝐵𝑇(𝑟0)  statistics are 
estimated over the period September 1995 to June 2008. The  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) and 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) 
statistics are obtained from the whole sample. The number of lags 𝑘 in Equation (9) is 
determined by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) with a maximum lag 12. Phillips 
et al. (2013) showed that the dynamic lag length selection results in a satisfactory size 
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for the 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test but positive size distortion for the 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test. Thus, in line 
with their empirical analysis, we set the lag order 𝑘 to zero for the 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹(𝑟0) test to 
lower the probability of a type 1 error. 
The recursive regressions were run with an initial window size of 44 observations 
(20% of the total sample) due to the sample size. The test results are given in Panel A of 
Table 3 whilst Panel B provides various right-sided critical values. 
[Table 3 around here] 
An analysis of the results in the Table 3 leads to several conclusions. First, all statistics 
for the spot price series readily reject the null hypothesis of no bubbles at the 1% level. 
Second, all statistics for all of the futures price series also provide evidence against the 
null hypothesis of no bubble at the 1% level. This result is novel and is one of the 
original findings of this study. Finally, the evidence supporting bubbles becomes 
stronger as the maturity of futures contracts increases. These patterns are consistent 
with the positive sample excess kurtosis and negative skewness that we observe in 
Table 2. Bubbles will contribute towards positive price changes during the boom phase 
and large negative price changes during the bust phase. Such a positive feedback 
mechanism will cause the mass of the probability distribution to be more concentrated 
on the right with fatter tails than a normally distributed variable (see, inter alios, 
Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Camerer, 1989). 
The support for bubbles in the spot and nearby futures is generally consistent 
with Shi and Arora (2012) although the timing differs, as we shall see in the next 
subsection. They use the convenience yield implied by the nearest and second nearest 
contracts in three different regime-switching models and report a short-lived bubble in 
late 2008 and early 2009. Our bubble timing is more consistent with Phillips and Yu 
(2011) who find a short bubble episode between March and July 2008 for spot oil 
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prices. Furthermore, their empirical findings offer some evidence in support of the 
sequential hypothesis of Caballero et al. (2008) who relate the oil bubble to global 
imbalances, the subprime crisis and volatile asset prices. 
 
5.2 Date stamping the bubbles 
Whilst Table 3 provides strong evidence of bubbles, they need to be date stamped. 
Figure 2 presents the results from the Phillips et al. (2013) GSADF procedure on bubble 
origination and collapse dates at the 5% level. We follow the literature in imposing a 
minimum six month bubble duration period on the grounds that shorter episodes can 
be regarded as just blips.  
[Figure 2 around here] 
There are some striking patterns in the results. First, they indicate a bubble in spot 
prices and the nearby futures (contract 1) from February 2008 to July 2008. The 
identical results for the spot and nearby contracts are no surprise as otherwise there 
would have been arbitrage opportunities. Second, the bubble duration increases along 
the yield curve. For example, it ranges from just 7 months (February to August 2008) 
for contract 3 to some four and a half years for contract 24. Contracts 6 through to 18 
exhibit evidence of multiple bubbles but there is a continuous bubble for contracts 21 
and 24 from April 2004 to August 2008. 
We summarise in Figure 3 the bubble periods at the 10% significance level. 
[Figure 3 around here] 
In contrast to the results in Figure 2, this now shows a continuous bubble for the 2004-
2008 period for contracts with maturities of 12 months and beyond. Again, the 
origination of the bubbles is in early 2004 whereas the collapse date for contracts 18 to 
24 shifts to September 2008. The earlier appearance of bubbles in longer maturity 
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contracts is interesting from a macro-prudential perspective. The evidence in this paper 
suggests that central banks could usefully employ bubble tests on longer maturity crude 
oil futures prices as part of an early warning system for detecting overheating in 
commodity and financial markets. 
 
5.3  Robustness checks 
5.3.1 Breaks in unconditional volatility 
The results so far suggest that longer-dated futures contracts have exhibited bubble 
behaviour since early 2004, which also marks the beginning of the financialisation of 
commodity futures markets. However, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 indicate that 
after 2004 there was an increase in the unconditional price volatility, especially in the 
case of longer-dated futures contracts. Given the work of Harvey et al. (2015), this 
raises the question of whether the documented bubble behaviour in crude oil spot and 
futures prices is spurious due to a break in the unconditional variance. Thus we test for 
possible (multiple) breaks in the unconditional volatility of crude oil spot and futures 
prices. 
Following Rapach et al. (2008) and Vivian and Wohar (2012), we employ a 
modified version of the cumulative sum of squares statistic suggested by Inclàn and 
Tiao (1994). Let 𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗ = 𝛥𝑌𝑡 −
1
𝑇
∑ 𝛥𝑌𝑗
𝑇
𝑗=1 , so that the statistic is given by: 
𝑀𝐼𝑇 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑘
|𝑇−0.5𝐺𝑘| (21) 
where 
𝐺𝑘 = 𝜆
−0.5 [𝐶𝑘 −
𝑘
𝑇
𝐶𝑇] , 
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𝐶𝑘 = ∑(𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗)2
𝑘
𝑡=1
, 
?̂? = 𝛾0 + 2 ∑[1 − 𝑙(𝑚 + 1)
−1]𝛾𝑙
𝑚
𝑙=1
 
𝛾𝑙 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ [(𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗)2 − ?̂?2][(𝛥𝑌𝑡−𝑙
∗ )2 − ?̂?2]
𝑇
𝑡=𝑙+1
, 
?̂?2 = 𝑇−1𝐶𝑇 , 
and the lag truncation parameter is selected as in Newey and West (1994). Because of 
the non-parametric adjustment, the 𝑀𝐼𝑇 statistic has been shown to possess good size 
properties even when 𝛥𝑌𝑡
∗ is characterised by some form of temporal dependencies like 
autocorrelation or autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (see Sansò et al., 
2004). To allow for multiple breaks in the variance, we apply the iterative algorithm 
described in Steps 0-3 in Inclàn and Tiao (1994, p.916) and employ the 𝑀𝐼𝑇 statistic. 
The break dates are depicted in Figure 4 along with the full-sample graph for each 
price series. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
Interestingly, the test results indicate that the spot and nearby contract (contract 1) 
exhibited two structural breaks (i.e., one in April 2004 and another in September 2007), 
whereas there is only one break in July 2005 for all other contracts. Whilst the break 
date in the longer dated contracts does not coincide exactly with the origination date of 
the explosive periods, there is still a possibility that the bubble test results reported 
above are misleading.  
Currently in the literature we do not have a non-stationary variance correction for 
the multiple bubble tests used in this paper. Therefore, as an approximation, we apply 
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the bootstrap algorithm suggested by Harvey et al. (2015, p.11) to the single bubble 
SADF(r0) statistic defined in (12).7 The results are summarised in Table 4.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Compared to the non-bootstrapped results in Table 3, unsurprisingly in Table 4, we find 
slightly weaker evidence of bubbles in the shorter-dated contracts even if the rejection 
is marginal at the 5% significance level in most cases. Nevertheless, all series exhibited 
bubble behaviour at the 10% significance level, whereas for longer-dated contracts (i.e. 
contracts 21 and 24) the test statistic is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, even 
allowing for non-stationary variance, the robustness results in this section support our 
baseline findings of bubbles in oil price series. 
 
5.3.2 Weekly frequency 
Finally, we examine the effect of data frequency on the bubble periods that we have 
identified. Using the same logic as with the monthly data, we create weekly series by 
taking Tuesday’s settlement price for each maturity.8 In particular, we roll over 
contracts on the last business day of the month prior to nearby expiration to create 
continuous series with a reasonably constant maturity. The bubble test results are 
reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Consistent with the results in Table 3, each test statistic is significant at the 1% level and 
the evidence for bubbles becomes even stronger as the maturity of the contracts 
                                                        
7 Note that Harvey et al. (2015) focus only on the SADF bubble test and offer no correction for the bubble 
date-stamping strategy. It is possible to extend their methodology to the bubble dating algorithm 
described in section 3.2 but we leave it as an area for future research since the asymptotic properties of 
the bootstrapped real time detectors have yet to be defined. 
8 Monday’s settlement price is used for those weeks when the last business day of the month is a Monday.  
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increases. The bubble periods identified by the date-stamping strategy are depicted in 
Figures 5 and 6 for the 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.  
[Figures 5 and 6 around here] 
Again, the results are consistent with the bubble periods depicted in Figures 2 and 3. 
Overall, the finding that longer-dated futures contracts may serve as an early warning 
system for bubble detection in the spot market appears robust at the weekly frequency 
also. For completeness, we also apply the unconditional variance break test and the 
Harvey et al. (2015) test to our weekly series. The results of the former can be seen in 
Table 6 and the latter in Table 7.  
[Table 6 around here] 
[Table 7 around here] 
The results in Table 6 suggest that more breaks are found in weekly, as opposed to 
monthly data. Given the additional noise in weekly data, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the results in Table 7 provide less evidence for bubbles than monthly counterparts. 
However, it is striking that 8 of the 10 series still suggest a bubble at the 10% level. 
 
5.4  Discussion 
The GSADF data stamping results indicate strong evidence of bubbles commencing in 
early 2004 for longer maturity contracts. This bubble origination date is significantly 
earlier than that for spot prices and contracts with shorter maturity. Contracts 12, 15, 
18, 21 and 24 show evidence of multiple and/or continuous bubbles starting in early 
2004. The upshot is that there is a clear indication that futures contracts with maturity 
above six months have been traded at prices considerably higher than their 
fundamental level since approximately early 2004. Interestingly, the year 2004 marks 
the increase of investment flows into commodity derivatives market that many 
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researchers believe changed oil futures price behaviour (see, e.g., Sockin and Xiong, 
2015, Tang and Xiong, 2012, and Singleton, 2014).  
Can we shed any further light on the appearance of bubbles from 2004? Figure 7 
depicts the average basis or carry of all contracts at different maturities for each 
calendar year, along the yield curve, from January 2004 to June 2008.9  
[Figure 7 around here] 
It is immediately clear that the average yield curve 2004-2008 in Figure 1 Panel B hides 
a number of dramatic details and shifts over time. The first is that the yield curve is far 
more sharply backwardated in 2004 as compared with the pre-2004 period. This made 
passive commodity index investment seem even more attractive around 2004. The 
second is that the yield curve shifts dramatically in each subsequent year. It shifts 
upward and flattens in 200510 whilst it moves into contango in 2006 before becoming 
almost horizontal in 2007 and mildly backwardated in 2008. Third, the shifts are most 
dramatic at longer maturities and probably reflect the massive flows into managed 
money commodity spread positions in those years. In that sense, the bubble duration 
evidence from the GSADF detector for the longer maturity contracts is consistent with 
the financialisation of commodities hypothesis.  
Büyükşahin and Robe (2014) and Büyükşahin et al. (2009) utilise a unique CFTC 
Large Trader Reporting System (LTRS) position dataset, which allows them to 
investigate the exact type of investor and their changing investment patterns over the 
last decade. They argue that positions of hedge funds and non-registered participants in 
long-dated futures have increased significantly since the early 2000s. However, hedge 
                                                        
9 The period from January to June was employed for 2008. 
10 The mild contango at shorter maturities in 2005 may reflect hedge funds front-running the Goldman 
roll (see Mou, 2011). 
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funds are generally recognised as sophisticated institutional investors. Their trading 
activities should correct for any price deviations from fundamental levels and 
contribute towards market efficiency, preventing the occurrence of bubbles (see Fama, 
1965). Contrary to the efficient market prospective, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) 
consider an economy where rational agents would deliberately allow bubbles to persist. 
Hedge funds may have been aware of the mispricing of long-dated futures but could 
have opted to benefit from it in the short run rather than correct it.  
Alternatively, Allen and Gorton (1993) provide a model in which a bubble arises in 
rational expectations equilibrium because of institutional investors’ agency problem. 
Portfolio managers’ payoffs have the form of a call option which will induce them to 
speculate on the future asset price path. In this context, our results are consistent with 
the existence of excess speculation in futures markets but can offer no definitive 
evidence on causality. 
 The contrasting results on bubbles for the spot and nearby contracts and those for 
the longer-dated futures contracts point to a potential disconnect between prices and 
fundamentals in the crude oil market. One possibility is that this might be driven by the 
type of rational bubble model outlined earlier. Another alternative is, that it might 
suggest a violation of market efficiency in the 2004-2008 period. Typically, market 
efficiency would imply cointegration between spot and longer-dated futures contracts 
which require both series to have a similar order of integration.  Our results contrast 
with those of Büyükşahin et al. (2009). Their ADF test results for the period from July 
2000 to August 2008 showed that nearby, 1- and 2-year futures prices were all I(1) and 
their results indicated the prices were cointegrated with one cointegrating vector. One 
possible explanation is the following. A well-known limitation of Dickey-Fuller type 
tests is that when applied to the full sample and the data are described by the 
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generating process in Equation (11), with a coefficient close to but greater than one, the 
unit root null hypothesis cannot be properly assessed. Evans (1991) showed that 
periodically collapsing bubble processes behave like an I(1) process and full-sample 
unit root tests have low power. 
A final possibility is that the increase in crude oil spot and futures prices might be 
due to changes in expected fundamentals.11 This type of rationale is given by Balke and 
Wohar (2001) for the stock price run-up in the 1990s. They show that after World War 
II, price-dividend and price-earnings ratios were quite persistent and subject to 
structural breaks. In this scenario, fundamentals can have a significant effect on price 
changes and even make price series appear explosive whilst adjusting towards the new 
equilibrium. They conclude that the 1990s stock price run-up can be rationalised by a 
combination of increasing expected real dividend (earnings) growth and declining 
expected future discount rates. Analogously, the crude oil futures price run up 2004-
2008 may have reflected changes in future expected demand and supply fundamentals.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the time-series properties of spot and futures crude oil prices 
for the presence of mildly explosive bubbles. In particular, it applies a battery of tests to 
monthly and weekly data for a range of futures prices along the yield curve, from the 
nearby contract to the 24-month contract. The sample period extends from September 
1995 to December 2013 and therefore includes the period of vastly increased 
investment flows into commodity derivative markets since the mid 2000s. Finally, the 
                                                        
11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing to this explanation. 
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paper also employs a procedure that allows for consistent identification of bubble 
origination and collapse dates.  
 The results are novel. The Phillips et al. (2013) GSADF multiple bubble test results 
indicate a disconnect between the spot and nearby contracts on one hand and the 
longer-dated oil futures contracts on the other hand. The latter provide significant 
evidence of extensive bubble periods. The prices for 12-month and longer series 
exhibited bubble behaviour from early 2004 up until late 2008, coinciding with the 
period of increased participation of financial investors including index trackers and 
hedge funds. The 2004-2008 bubble period was characterised by dramatic shifts in the 
yield curve. These are most dramatic at longer maturities and probably reflect the 
massive flows into managed money commodity spread positions in those years. It is 
quite plausible that the popularity of managed money spread positions highlighted by 
Singleton (2014) and Büyükşahin and Robe (2014) contributed to the price run up at 
longer maturities. Although a necessary condition, our new results do not necessarily 
infer that excessive speculation in commodity futures markets contributed towards 
price deviations away from fundamental levels in the physical market. Further 
empirical analysis is needed to clarify in more detail the exact source of bubble like 
behaviour. On the methodological side, future work could also usefully examine the 
effect of non-stationary volatility on tests for multiple bubbles.  
 Finally, our results have pertinent policy implications. Since bubbles appear 
earlier in longer dated futures contracts, they suggest that these contracts may provide 
additional information, over and above that of the more examined shorter-dated 
alternatives. Bubble tests on long maturity crude oil futures contracts may prove useful 
both for real-time monitoring and in terms of providing potential early warning signals 
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for bubble formation. Thus evidence on bubbles in long maturity oil futures contracts 
could form an input into macro-prudential policy for a bubble early warning system. 
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Table 1: Description of futures contracts 
A description of the relationship between the last business day of the month on which we 
observe the price for our data series (price month), the month in which the futures contract 
stops trading (expiration month), and the month in which delivery takes place (delivery month). 
NYMEX crude oil futures expire on the third business day prior to 25th calendar day of the 
month proceeding the delivery month. If the 25th happens to be a non-business day, the 
expiration day is the third business day prior to the business day proceeding the 25th. 𝐹𝑗,𝑡 
denotes the jth contract at time t. For illustrative purposes we choose 𝑡 = 1, which represents 
the price on September 29, 1995. 
𝐹𝑗,𝑡 Price month 
Expiration 
month 
Delivery 
month 
𝐹1,1  1995M09 1995M10 1995M11 
𝐹3,1 1995M09 1995M12 1996M01 
𝐹6,1 1995M09 1996M03 1996M04 
𝐹9,1 1995M09 1996M06 1996M07 
𝐹12,1 1995M09 1996M09 1996M10 
𝐹15,1 1995M09 1996M12 1997M01 
𝐹18,1 1995M09 1997M03 1997M04 
𝐹21,1 1995M09 1997M06 1997M07 
𝐹24,1 1995M09 1997M09 1997M10 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
This reports the main characteristics of the monthly spot and futures log return series. 
Statistics Spot 
Contract 
1 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
Panel A: September 1995 – December 2013 
Mean 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 
Std. 0.093 0.093 0.083 0.073 0.067 0.062 0.059 0.056 0.055 0.053 
Skewness 1.421 1.470 1.903 2.452 3.016 3.421 3.731 3.725 3.605 3.351 
Kurtosis -0.453 -0.478 -0.518 -0.565 -0.654 -0.701 -0.716 -0.683 -0.623 -0.534 
Panel B: September 1995 – December 2003 
Mean 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Std. 0.095 0.097 0.081 0.064 0.053 0.046 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.033 
Skewness 0.413 0.506 1.040 1.351 1.331 1.104 1.107 0.946 0.998 0.891 
Kurtosis -0.074 -0.086 -0.052 0.211 0.372 0.493 0.550 0.451 0.355 0.245 
Panel C: January 2004 – June 2008 
Mean 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Std. 0.078 0.078 0.073 0.069 0.065 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.059 
Skewness -0.992 -1.038 -1.154 -1.058 -0.953 -0.857 -0.775 -0.701 -0.597 -0.505 
Kurtosis -0.281 -0.233 -0.226 -0.218 -0.183 -0.125 -0.058 0.019 0.091 0.160 
Panel D: July 2008 – December 2013 
Mean -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
Std. 0.099 0.099 0.092 0.086 0.081 0.077 0.073 0.070 0.068 0.065 
Skewness 3.160 3.250 3.384 3.392 3.540 3.659 3.659 3.525 3.237 2.961 
Kurtosis -0.882 -0.992 -1.001 -1.080 -1.179 -1.247 -1.277 -1.260 -1.215 -1.170 
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Table 3: Testing for explosive behaviour in WTI crude oil spot and futures price 
series – monthly frequency 
The 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶 and 𝑆𝐵𝑇 test statistics are estimated over the sample period September 1995 to June 
2008 (154 monthly observations) to enhance the power of the tests. The 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹 and 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹 test 
statistics are estimated over the sample period September 1995 to December 2013 (220 
monthly observations). All tests are calculated recursively with a fraction of the total sample 
𝑟0 = 20% (44 observations) for the initial window size. The right-sided critical values in Panel B 
are approximated using Monte Carlo simulations with 10,000 replications. 
 
SADF SDFC SBT GSADF 
Panel A: Test statistics 
Spot 3.675 3.863 1.341 3.675 
Contract 1 3.641 3.838 1.325 3.641 
Contract 3 4.120 4.210 1.475 4.120 
Contract 6 4.675 4.721 1.637 4.675 
Contract 9 5.052 5.102 1.724 5.052 
Contract 12 4.707 5.350 1.766 5.297 
Contract 15 5.241 5.515 1.787 5.461 
Contract 18 5.522 5.635 1.797 5.580 
Contract 21 5.807 5.750 1.810 5.807 
Contract 24 5.919 5.831 1.828 5.919 
Panel B: Critical values 
90% 1.041 0.709 0.788 1.584 
95% 1.350 1.063 0.933 1.854 
99% 1.980 1.749 1.241 2.362 
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Table 4: Testing for explosive behaviour in WTI crude oil spot and futures price 
series – bootstrapping and monthly series 
The table reports the results of applying the bootstrap algorithm suggested by Harvey et al. (2015, 
p.11) to the SADF(r0) statistic defined in (12).   
 
 
 
 
  
Contract p-value 
Spot 0.060 
Contract 1 0.061 
Contract 3 0.054 
Contract 6 0.052 
Contract 9 0.054 
Contract 12 0.054 
Contract 15 0.056 
Contract 18 0.055 
Contract 21 0.048 
Contract 24 0.045 
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Table 5: Testing for explosive behaviour in WTI crude oil spot and futures price 
series - weekly frequency 
This table is similar to Table 3 but we use weekly prices for the spot and futures contracts. 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝐶 
and 𝑆𝐵𝑇 test statistics are estimated over the sample period September 1995 to June 2008 to 
enhance the power of the tests. The 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹 and 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐹 test statistics are estimated over the full 
sample period September 1995 to December 2013 (954 weekly observations). All tests are 
calculated recursively with a fraction of the total sample 𝑟0 = 10% for the initial window size. The 
right-sided critical values in Panel B are approximated using Monte Carlo simulations with 5,000 
replications. 
 
SADF SDFC SBT GSADF 
Panel A: Test statistics 
Spot 3.393 3.602 2.186 2.972 
Contract 1 3.266 3.832 2.566 3.266 
Contract 3 3.867 4.263 3.231 3.867 
Contract 6 4.534 4.723 4.060 4.534 
Contract 9 4.957 4.986 4.603 4.957 
Contract 12 5.228 5.239 4.920 5.228 
Contract 15 5.407 5.419 5.108 5.407 
Contract 18 5.522 5.535 5.192 5.522 
Contract 21 5.771 5.636 5.247 5.623 
Contract 24 5.924 5.691 5.228 5.678 
Panel B: Critical values 
90% 1.233 1.037 0.879 1.923 
95% 1.471 1.345 1.021 2.177 
99% 2.042 2.025 1.364 2.679 
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Table 6: Volatility breaks – weekly frequency 
Unconditional variance break dates are summarised below. We use a response surface as in Sansò 
et al. (2004) to generate the 5% critical values.  
 
 
  
Contract Weekly break dates (month/year) 
Spot Nov 1999, Sep 2004, Oct 2007 
Contract 1 Dec 1999, Sep 2004, Oct 2007 
Contract 3 Jan 2000, Sep 2004, Oct 2007 
Contract 6 Jan 2000, Feb 2004, Jul 2005, Oct 2007 
Contract 9 Jan 2000, Mar 2004, Jun 2005, Nov 2007 
Contract 12 Jan 2000, Feb 2004, Aug 2005, Nov 2007 
Contract 15 Feb 2000, Feb 2004, May 2005, Oct 2007 
Contract 18 Mar 2000, Mar 2004, Jul 2005, Oct 2007 
Contract 21 May 2000, Apr 2004, Jul 2005, Dec 2007 
Contract 24 May 2000, Feb 2004, Jul 2005, Oct 2007 
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Table 7: Testing for explosive behaviour in WTI crude oil spot and futures price 
series – bootstrapping and weekly frequency 
The table reports the results of applying the bootstrap algorithm suggested by Harvey et al. (2015, 
p.11) to the SADF(r0) statistic defined in (12).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Contract p-value 
Spot 0.131 
Contract 1 0.108 
Contract 3 0.082 
Contract 6 0.070 
Contract 9 0.067 
Contract 12 0.069 
Contract 15 0.069 
Contract 18 0.071 
Contract 21 0.072 
Contract 24 0.072 
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Figure 1: Futures yield curves 
The figure depicts the average basis (solid line) of all contracts at different maturities along the yield 
curve over the three subsample periods – September 1995 to December 2003 (Panel A), January 
2004 to June 2008 (Panel B), and July 2008 to December 2013 (Panel C).  
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Figure 2: Bubble periods at the 5% significance level 
The backward SADF statistic sequence (solid line) is plotted against the 95% critical value sequence 
(dashed line). The initial sample for the BSADF procedure is chosen to be 20% of the total sample 
(44 observations). The estimations are performed over the sample period September 1995 to 
December 2013. The right-sided critical 95% values are approximated using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 10,000 replications.  
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Figure 3: Bubble periods at the 10% significance level 
The backward SADF statistic sequence (solid line) is plotted against the 90% critical value sequence 
(dashed line). The initial sample for the BSADF procedure is chosen to be 20% of the total sample 
(44 observations). The estimations are performed over the sample period September 1995 to. 
December 2013. The right-sided critical 90% values are approximated using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 10,000 replications. 
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Figure 4: Volatility breaks 
Unconditional volatility break dates are summarised along with the price series of each contract. 
The vertical line represents the structural break point in the unconditional variance of each 
corresponding series. We use a response surface as in Sansò et al. (2004) to generate the 5% 
critical values. 
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Figure 5: Bubble periods at the 5% significance level - weekly frequency 
The backward SADF statistic sequence (solid line) is plotted against the 95% critical value sequence 
(dashed line). The initial sample for the BSADF procedure is chosen to be 20% of the total sample 
(96 observations). The estimations are performed over the sample period September 1995 to 
December 2013. The right-sided critical 95% values are approximated using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 10,000 replications.  
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Figure 6: Bubble periods at the 10% significance level - weekly frequency 
The backward SADF statistic sequence (solid line) is plotted against the 90% critical value sequence 
(dashed line). The initial sample for the BSADF procedure is chosen to be 20% of the total sample 
(96 observations). The estimations are performed over the sample period September 1995 to 
December 2013. The right-sided critical 90% values are approximated using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 10,000 replications.  
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Figure 7: Annual futures yield curves 2004-2008 
This depicts the average basis of all contracts at different maturities for each year along the yield 
curve from January 2004 (solid line) to June 2008. 
 
